This paper sheds light on how and why the stock market values high technology by examining the pricing of 606 publicly traded biotechnology firms. Contrary to the common view that the primary value drivers of biotechnology are 'soft' variables such as intellectual human capital, patents, strategic alliances and joint ventures, I show that simple but 'hard' balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash flows data explains some 70% of the variance in biotech firms' equity market values within a log-linear regression framework. Given the size and economic importance of R&D to biotech firms, I also analyze the mapping between the biotech firms' R&D expenditures and equity market values. I hypothesize that the elasticity of equity market value with respect to R&D is a function of five factors: where the R&D lies in the biotech value chain of discovery, development and commercialization; the growth rate in R&D spending; the scale of R&D expenditures; the human capital of the firm's employees; and the age of the firm. Using financial statement proxies for these factors, I find that the elasticity of biotech firms' equity market values with respect to R&D is significantly larger the earlier is the R&D expenditure in the value chain, and the greater is the growth rate in R&D spending. The value elasticity of R&D is also reliably decreasing in the scale of R&D expenditures, and the maturity of the firm.
1.

Introduction
Despite its size and public importance, little academic research has sought to empirically identify or analyze the determinants of the equity market values of a growing high technology sector of the U.S. economy-that of biotechnology. The goal of this paper is to take some initial steps toward obtaining that understanding by shedding light on how financial statement data in general, and R&D expenditures in particular, associate with biotech firms' equity market values, and why from an economic point of view such associations exist.
Broadly speaking, technology is the application of the scientific method and scientific knowledge to industrial or commercial objectives. Biotechnology is the application of technology, particularly genetics, to industrial or manufacturing aspects of the life sciences.
Biotechnology applications include the production of drugs, synthetic hormones and bulk foodstuffs; the bioconversion of organic waste; and the use of genetically altered bacteria.
Biotechnology falls squarely within the definition of high technology because 'high' technology distinguishes itself from 'low' technology by having three special characteristics: an intensive investment in R&D, a crucial role for knowledge capital in creating value, and high growth opportunities (Liu, 2000) . The largest and most important components of a biotech firm's production and investment functions are its R&D expenditures and the discoveries made by the knowledge and skill of its bioscientists and bioengineers. When successful, this knowledge produces the intellectual property and legal patents that can rapidly translate into hundreds of millions of dollars in annual sales and profits, and/or a large equity market value.
I analyze the relations between biotech firms' equity market values and the financial accounting data that are publicly available from quarterly financial statements. I do so with two goals in mind. First, a common view is that the primary drivers and indicators of the value created by biotechnology are 'soft' variables such as intellectual human capital, patents, strategic alliances and joint ventures (e.g., Bratic, Tilton and Balakrishnan, 2000) . The validity of such a view, however, runs counter to much research in accounting that both theoretically and empirically concludes that 'hard' financial statement data should and do explain large amounts of the cross-sectional variation in firms' equity market values. As an accounting researcher, I am therefore interested in determining whether biotechnology firms are different in this regard than practically all other industries or types of firms, and if so, why.
Second, because of the size and importance of R&D to biotech firms, I am also keen to develop and test economic hypotheses about the mapping between the biotech firms' equity market values and their R&D expenditures. For reasons that I expand on later in the paper, I
hypothesize that the elasticity of biotech firms' equity market values with respect to their R&D expenditures (the "value elasticity of R&D") will be a function of five factors: where the R&D lies in the value chain of discovery, development and commercialization; the growth rate in R&D spending; the scale of R&D expenditures; the human capital of the firm's employees; and the maturity of the firm.
I test these hypotheses using quarterly market and financial statement data on 606 U.S. biotech firms that were publicly traded at some time during the period 1989:q1-2000:q3. For each quarter within the sample period, I estimate a log-linear regression of the equity market value of the firm on disaggregated balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash flows data. Disaggregating financial statement data is important for R&D intensive companies because under U.S. GAAP, R&D expenditures are not permitted to be capitalized and amortized into income over time, but must be immediately written off against earnings. This means that aggregate balance sheet and income statement variables such as shareholder equity and net income are biased measures of the economic position and earnings of the firm. Correlating such economically biased measures of economic position and earnings of the firm with equity market values typically results in severely misspecified regressions and counter-intuitive coefficient signs and magnitudes. These problems are mitigated if the components of shareholder equity and net income are instead used as independent variables (Hand 2001a , Zhang 2000 .
My initial analysis therefore consists of regressing, within a contemporaneous log-linear framework, the equity values of biotech firms' on their contributed capital, retained earnings and treasury stock (three key components of shareholder equity); revenues, cost of sales, selling general and administrative expenses, R&D expense (four key components of net income); and dividends (from the statement of cash flows). I find that these financial statement variables together explain some 70% of the variance in biotech firms' equity market values, casting doubt on the common view that the primary value drivers of biotechnology are 'soft' variables such as intellectual human capital, patents, strategic alliances and joint ventures. Such soft variables may indeed be value-relevant-that is, incrementally informative in explaining cross-sectional variation in equity market values-but the strength of my results based on financial statement data suggests that they are unlikely to be the primary drivers of biotech firms' stock prices.
Beyond the substantial value-relevance of basic financial statement data, I further employ the log-linear regression framework to test my hypotheses concerning the determinants of the value elasticity of R&D-namely where the R&D lies in the biotech value chain of discovery, development and commercialization; the growth rate in R&D spending; the scale of R&D expenditures; the human capital of the firm's employees; and the age of the firm. I develop financial statement proxies for each of these factors and interact them with R&D expense to determine whether the factors are value-relevant. I find that the elasticity of biotech firms' equity market values with respect to R&D is significantly larger the earlier is the R&D expenditure in the value chain, and the greater is the growth rate in R&D spending. The value elasticity of R&D is also reliably decreasing in the scale of R&D expenditures, and in the maturity of the firm. However, the value elasticity of R&D appears unrelated to proxies for both the quantity and quality of employee human capital, perhaps because the quantity and quality of employee human capital is not accurately captured through financial accounting metrics.
I infer from these results that despite the typically huge uncertainty inherent in the production and investment functions of biotechnology companies, particularly with regard to R&D, investors appear to price the equity of such firms in a more sophisticated manner than would be supposed from a popular viewpoint. Investors map the components of shareholder equity and net income into equity market values for biotech firms in similar directions to nonbiotech firms. Investors also seem to value the key R&D intangible in a manner that recognizes the stage that the firm's R&D is at in the value chain, the likelihood the firm will obtain property rights on its R&D, and the firm's maturity. Such sophistication would seem to bode well for the growth of and accurate capital allocation in this growing area of high technology.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the major attributes of biotechnology, and summarizes prior research on biotechnology firms and the stock market's valuation of R&D. Section 3 more fully develops the hypotheses and required proxy variables outlined above, while section 4 describes the sample identification and data requirements processes and reports descriptive statistics for the firm-quarters used in the study.
Section 5 motivates the regression model used to test the hypotheses on the sample data, and reports the results of my empirical tests and the inferences I draw from those results. Section 6 concludes.
2.
Biotechnology and R&D
Technology
The American Heritage Dictionary defines technology as the application of the scientific method and scientific knowledge to industrial/commercial objectives. More loosely, technology is the set of ways that humans can reconfigure physical objects by creating new recipes for their use. Based on that definition, there is little doubt that science and technology-and the innovation they create-have in the past, and should in the future, generate new wealth. The reconfiguring of physical objects that technology makes possible boosts productivity, spawns new opportunities for profit, and ultimately drives economic growth. As Romer (1999) notes:
In 1870, average real income per person in the U.S. was about $2,500. By 1994, average income per person had increased to about $22,500, a nine-fold increase.
Everything we know about history, technology and economic theory tells us that an increase of this magnitude would not have been possible in the absence of technological change. We did not increase income per person by a factor of nine by accumulating more ox carts and water-driven mills.
Due to Romer and other "new growth" theorists, technology is now recognized as playing a vital role in creating, sustaining and increasing economic growth. Whereas earlier neo-classical growth theory treated scientific discovery, technology and innovation as peripheral in economic growth, the new growth view makes them endogenous and center-stage in importance.
Assigning a primary role to scientific discovery, technology and innovation has helped shed light on how economic growth can be sustained and even accelerated in a physical world that is characterized by diminishing returns and scarcity (Romer, 1999) .
Biotechnology
Broadly speaking, biotechnology is the application of technology to the life sciences.
More carefully defined, biotechnology is a collection of techniques that use living cells or their processes to solve problems and to perform specific industrial or manufacturing processes.
Applications include the production of drugs, synthetic hormones and bulk foodstuffs, the bioconversion of organic waste, and the use of genetically altered bacteria. find that where and when U.S. star scientists were actively producing academic publications is a key determinant of where and when commercial firms began to use biotechnology. In particular, the extent of collaboration by a biotech firm's scientists with star U.S. bioscientists is a powerful predictor of the firm's ultimate success along such dimensions as products in development, products on the market, and the number of people employed by the firm. Audretsch and Stephan (1996) find that while many university-based scientists participate in geographic networks, 70% of the links between biotech produced by the hybrid cell created by cell fusion. Monoclonal antibodies serve as the body's defense against disease-causing bacteria, viruses, and cancer cells (Kenney, 1986; Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999 Aghion and Tirole's (1994) proposition that the allocation of control rights to an R&D-intensive biotech firm increases with the firm's financial resources, although the relation between control rights and the stage of the project at the time the alliance is signed is more ambiguous. Robinson and Stuart (2000) posit that the stock of prior alliances between participants in the biotech industry produces a network through which information is transmitted, and that such a network serves as a superior governance mechanism to other forms of control in inter-firm transactions. They find supportive evidence using the degree of equity participation and the amount of funding pledged in a sample of actual biotech alliance agreements.
Insofar as the valuation of biotech firms is concerned, three studies are of note. Stuart, Hoang and Hybels (1999) test the hypothesis that when faced with great uncertainty about the quality of young companies, third parties rely on the prominence of the affiliates of those companies to judge the quality. They find very strong and consistent evidence that privatelyheld biotech firms with prominent strategic alliance partners and organizational equity investors benefit from the transfer of status from those entities by going public faster and at higher valuations than do firms that lack such connections. Darby, Liu and Zucker (1999) (Grabowski and Mueller, 1978; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1982; Sougiannis, 1994; Nissim and Thomas, 2000) . Recently, Kothari, Laguerre and Leone (2001) and Hand (2001b) have broadened the scope of this literature by investigating the riskiness and returns-to-scale of R&D. Kothari, Laguerre and Leone show that R&D expenditures yield realized earnings that are more variable (i.e., benefits that are more uncertain) than do investments in PP&E, while Hand reports that expenditures on both R&D and advertising exhibit increasing profitability returns-to-scale in the sense that R&D and advertising are more profitable the larger are the magnitude of the expenditures made, particularly in the 1990s.
The second question that has been asked by scholars is how accurately the future benefits of R&D are reflected in firms' market values. The evidence suggests that although the market recognizes that R&D has future benefits (Hall, 1993; Sougiannis, 1994; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996) , it does not price R&D in a completely efficient manner (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis, 2001; Chambers, Jennings and Thompson, 2001 ).
R&D has also become a fulcrum for those who argue that the recognition and disclosure rules for intangibles under U.S. GAAP are deficient and economically damaging. The increasing prominence of R&D, brand and human capital intangibles in firms' business strategies in the 1990s has focused renewed attention on the inadequacies of SFAS No. 2. For example, Lev (2000, 2001) and Aboody and Lev (2001) argue that the uniform expensing of R&D and the paltry quantity and quality of R&D-related disclosure are both increasingly indefensible from an accounting standard setting point of view, and moreover create large information asymmetries that increase firms' cost of capital and provide lucrative opportunities for insiders.
Hypotheses
My goal in this paper is to add to the relatively thin literature on the determinants of biotech firms' equity market values. I do so with two goals in mind. First, a common view in the business world is that the primary drivers of the value created by biotechnology activities are 'soft' factors such as the number and importance of patents; strategic alliances, partnerships and joint ventures; the intellectual human capital of employees, particularly star scientists; and investor sentiment (e.g., Bratic, Tilton and Balakrishnan, 2000) . The not infrequent lack of revenues and/or positive earnings leads many to conclude that biotech valuation is far more of an art than a science.
Such a perspective implies that accounting data will be inferior to the soft variables listed above when it comes to explaining cross-sectional variation in the equity market values of biotech firms. While this implication might be true, it would run counter to a great deal of accounting research that both theoretically and empirically concludes that financial statement data per se should and do explain large amounts of the cross-sectional variation in firms' equity 
Location of R&D in the biotechnology value chain
The prototypical biotechnology value chain of discovery, development and commercialization is a long one, stretching as far as fifteen years from beginning work on discovery to completing the regulatory review process and post-marketing testing. The major technical steps in the biotech value chain are summarized and detailed in Figure 1 . They consist of discovery, pre-clinical testing, phase I trials, phase II trials, phase III trials, and FDA approval.
I hypothesize that the earlier R&D expenditures lie in the value chain the greater will be the value elasticity of R&D. This is because the earlier is R&D spending in the value chain, the riskier yet larger is likely to be its ultimate payoff. The economic value of early stage R&D is heightened beyond a simple NPV viewpoint due to the presence of real options. As shown in Figure 1 , discovery stage biotech R&D lies at the beginning of the chain of scientific, technical and regulatory milestones along the way to obtaining patent protection of intellectual property.
Early stage R&D therefore has more real option value than does later stage R&D because before it stretch options to accelerate vs. delay, expand vs. contract, abandon vs. continue, develop inhouse vs. subcontract, and go-it-alone vs. secure a strategic alliance-many of which occur not just once along the value chain but are repeated.
I therefore predict that R&D expenditures that lie earlier (later) in the value chain will have a larger (smaller) value elasticity of R&D. Following Cumming and Macintosh (2000) who find that early-stage Canadian biotech firms spend a greater proportion of their expenditures on R&D than do later-stage firms, the financial statement proxy I use for location in the value chain is the ratio of quarterly R&D expense to revenues.
3.2
Growth rate of R&D spending I next hypothesize that holding constant the location of R&D spending in the value chain, firms whose R&D spending is growing faster will have higher value elasticities of R&D. This is because a biotech firm seeking to discover and develop a new cure is in a race with competitors to be the first to make the discovery and secure patent protection of the successful intellectual property. I argue that it is reasonable to suppose that the faster a biotech firm is able to ramp up its spending on R&D, the higher is the probability that it will win the race and thereby secure the winner's supra-normal profits. Using similar reasoning, biotech firms are also likely to spend R&D faster the larger is the anticipated size of the market for the winning intellectual property.
The financial statement proxy I use for the speed with which a firm ramps up its R&D spending is the year-to-year growth rate in quarterly R&D expense.
3.3
Scale of spending on R&D In addition to the rate of growth in R&D spending, the scale of R&D spending may affect the value elasticity of R&D. Most research from industrial economics suggests that innovative activities such as R&D may exhibit decreasing output-denominated returns-to-scale (Scherer, 1980; Audretsch, 1987, 1988; Graves and Langowitz, 1993) . For example, Graves and Langowitz (1993) conclude that for firms in the pharmaceutical industry, increasing levels of R&D spending is positively related to the number of new chemical agreements (NCEs) produced, but at a decreasing rate. The explanation favored by Graves and Langowitz for this result is that large R&D spending occurs in large companies, where bureaucracy, red-tape, and conservatism make it difficult for creative and inventive ideas to succeed. On the other hand, a recent large-sample study by Hand (2001b) finds that R&D expenditures are on average characterized by increasing profitability returns-to-scale, and that this relation has strengthened in the 1990s relative to what it was in the 1980s. Hand interprets his findings as being due to larger scale R&D expenditures leading to a disproportionately larger probability of obtaining a legal or natural monopoly on the innovation arising from the R&D. In view of the mixed results in prior research, I do not predict the sign of any economies-of-scale effects on the value elasticity of R&D. The natural financial statement proxy to use for the scale of R&D spending is the dollar amount of quarterly R&D expense.
3.4
Value of employee's human capital I also evaluate the impact that employees' knowledge and skill has on the value elasticity of R&D. The intellectual human capital of bioscientists, particularly 'star' scientists, has been found to be an important determinant of where and when commercial firms began to use biotechnology and the ultimate success of biotech firms . Estimates of the value of star scientists are positively correlated with biotech firms' equity market values (Darby, Liu and Zucker, 1999) . Such results lead me to hypothesize that the value elasticity of R&D is increasing in the quantity and/or quality of employee human capital. I measure the quantity of human capital employed by the firm using the total number of employees, and the quality of human capital by the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses (SGA) to the number of employees. One component of SGA is the salary cost of senior management and scientists. Although probably very noisy, I propose that the ratio of SGA to the number of employees will be proportional to the size of the average salary paid to senior management and scientists, and therefore a proxy for the quality of employee human capital.
3.5 Age/maturity of the firm Finally, I examine the relation between the value elasticity of R&D and the age/maturity of the firm, but make no prediction as to the sign of the relation. Firm maturity may enhance or hinder the value elasticity of R&D. On the one hand, more mature biotech firms are less likely to attract the kinds of freewheeling star scientists who are best at discovery. Highly creative individuals may become discouraged in mature firms, and as firms mature the best researchers may be promoted to supervisory or administrative positions, leaving less capable scientists to undertake scientific discovery (Graves and Langowitz, 1993) . On the other hand, more mature biotech firms are likely to have greater scientific and managerial experience; more extensive networks of strategic alliances with other biotech firms as well as pharmaceutical companies and universities; more sophisticated business advisors; and less financial risk. I measure the maturity of a firm by the number of years it has been publicly traded.
Firms and data
U.S. biotech firms that are or were publicly traded were identified through a variety of sources that were merged to create an initial master list of potential biotech companies. The sources included both those that report information on currently traded biotech firms, and those that identify biotech firms that are no longer publicly traded, typically because of bankruptcy or acquisition. 2 The former sources included www.biospace.com, www.recap.com, Robbins-Roth to the nature of the regressions I conduct in the next section of the paper, contributed capital, retained earnings, net income, revenues, cost of sales, dividends, and the end-of-fiscal quarter market value of common equity were required to be non-missing. Furthermore, contributed capital, revenues, cost of sales, dividends, and the end-of-fiscal quarter market value of common equity were required to be non-negative. Finally, and importantly, since the focus of this paper is biotech firms, large pharmaceutical (so-called "big-pharma") firms in the master list were identified from www.phrma.org and Robbins-Roth (2000) and excluded. The final dataset consists of 606 different biotech firms with a total of 12,520 usable firm-quarter observations. missing, in cases where SGA was missing COS was also set missing. This means that only a subset of firms has non-missing SGA and COS. However, the sum of COS and SGA, denoted COSGA, is readily available, being defined as COS + SGA when SGA is not missing, and max{COS -RD, 0} when SGA is missing. Core pre-tax income is defined as REV -COS -SGA -RD when SGA is not missing, and as REV -COSGA -RD when SGA is missing. All dollar amounts are restated into 2000 dollars using the CPI in December 2000. Table 2 shows the numbers of biotech firms used in the study across time and SIC- Concluding the descriptive statistics is Table 4 . Table 4 The median market-to-book ratio is 3.7, likely reflecting both the biased accounting for R&D and other intangibles and an expectation on the part of the market of substantial future growth. Actual real growth rates in revenues are 15% per year at the median, but 25% of annual real revenue growth rates exceed 61%. Biotech firms have few tangible fixed assets, with the median firm holding only 12% of its total assets in PP&E. In contrast, biotech firms spend very intensively on R&D. The median firm spends 45% of its revenue on R&D, $16,000 per employee, and is growing that spending at a median real rate of 9.3% per year.
Empirical tests
Log-linear regression model
The past ten years have seen a surge in the theoretical development and empirical testing of accounting-based valuation models in which equity market value is expressed as a linear function of book equity and current and/or expected future net income (Ohlson 1995; Ohlson 1995, 1996; Barth, Beaver and Landsman 1998; Dechow, Hutton and Sloan 1999; Hand and Landsman 2000) . Estimation of these linear models has been through OLS applied either to undeflated dollar values; deflated data where the most common deflators are the number of shares outstanding, book equity and total assets; and in returns rather than in levels.
In this paper I employ a different and deliberately more agnostic approach. I assume that a firm's equity market value is a Cobb-Douglas production function of its current financial statement data. Taking logs then leads to a log-linear expression for the firm's equity market value. Although log-linear models have been employed extensively in economics, particularly for valuing R&D (Hall, 1993; Hall, 2000; Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001 ), they are rare in accounting and finance.
5
I employ a log-linear model for two main reasons. First, in log-linear regressions the influence of anomalous or outlier observations is dramatically reduced and a greater homoscedasticity in regression residuals is acheived. These are significant concerns for biotech firms because of the high degree of skewness observed in biotech firms' equity market values, net income, book equity, etc. (table 4) . To finesse the reasonable concern that a minority of the data drives the magnitude and/or significance of parameter estimates, most researchers who apply OLS regression to non-logged data first identify and then winsorize or delete outliers. This potentially ad-hoc process is all but unnecessary within a log-linear model because the log transformation dramatically dampens the values of previously extreme observations. My interest in this paper is in the signs of the relations between equity market values and financial statement data, not the magnitudes of those relations. Employing an empirically robust regression method such as the log-linear specification is therefore very important. Second, recent work by Ye and Finn (2000) and Beatty, Riffe and Thompson (2001) provide the beginnings of a theoretical justification for the use of log-linear valuation specifications in research that employs financial accounting data.
6
In the somewhat agnostic approach to valuation that I have taken, the set of current financial statement data is taken to be a sufficient predictor of the present value of the expected future net cash flows accruing to the firm's common shareholders. Clearly, such a simplistic view could be made more sophisticated by including past financial statement data and/or instruments for expected future net cash flows. I limit myself to only current financial statement data for reasons of parsimony and data availability-adding past financial statement data would make the analysis quite cumbersome, and instruments for expected future net cash flows such as analyst earnings forecasts are unavailable for all but a tiny fraction of firm-years.
Log-transformations of variables
Each variable Z in the regression is log-transformed using the following:
This transformation is information-preserving in the sense of being monotone and one-to-one.
The addition of $1,000 to Z provides that LZ is defined when Z is zero. Equation (1) also ensures that negative values of core income and book equity are not discarded. Panel A of table 5 reports the means and medians of the main variables used in the regressions after being log-transformed, and demonstrates that the log-transformation dramatically reduces the extreme right-skewness of the raw data found in table 4. 6 Ye and Finn (2000) motivate their log-linear model of firms' equity market values, book equity and net income by demonstrating that if the log of one plus the return on equity follows an AR(1) process, and net dividends are zero, then equity market value emerges as a multiplicative function of book equity and net income. Beatty, Riffe and Thompson (2001) derive a log-linear valuation model under three structural assumptions: (1) stock valuation is first degree homogenous in underlying valuation drivers, (2) accounting constructs measure such valuation drivers with multiplicative measurement error that is conditionally lognormal, and (3) the unconditional distribution of stock values is either diffuse or lognormal.
5.3
Structure of regressions Table 6 reports the results of log-linear regressions aimed at generally determining the value-relevance of financial statement data for the equity market values of U.S. biotech firms, and specifically testing the hypotheses outlined in sections 3.1 -3.5. The dependent variable in each regression is LMVE, the log of the firm's equity market value at the end of a given fiscal quarter. 7 Rather than pooling all available observations across firms and time, I run one regression for each of the 47 fiscal quarters over the period 1989:q1-2000:q3 and then base my inferences on the resulting time-series of coefficient estimates. This approach is more likely to yield unbiased inferences as to the sign and magnitude of underlying coefficients than is using pooled data, because it is highly likely that in pooled data the assumption that residuals are uncorrelated across time and across firms is severely violated. Following Fama and MacBeth (1973) , I compute and report the mean coefficient estimate and a simple t-statistic on the mean. Table 6 is structured as a series of different regressions that begin by using aggregate accounting data, and then move on to regressions based on decomposing the aggregate data into its major elements. A visual description of the regression structure is provided in Figure 4 . For example, model 1 regresses the log of biotech firms' equity market values on their book equity, core income and dividends, while model 2 decomposes book equity into its three major components (contributed capital, retained earnings, and treasury stock) and separates positive core income from negative core income. Relative to model 2, model 3 instead disaggregates core income into revenues, cost of sales, selling general and administrative expenses, and R&D expense. Model 4 is similar to model 3 except that it uses the sum of cost of sales and selling general and administrative expenses because cost of sales and selling general and administrative expenses are not always separately available on quarterly Compustat. Models 1-4 therefore determine the overall relevance of financial statement data for the equity market values of U.S. biotech firms. In contrast, models 5 -9 test the hypotheses outlined in sections 3.1 -3.5 by adding to models 3 and 4 interactions between R&D and proxies for the hypothesized determinants of the value elasticity of R&D.
As noted, model 1 regresses the log of biotech firms' equity market values on their book equity, core income and dividends. In model 1, book equity is the primary balance sheet variable, core income is the primary income statement variable, and dividends is the primary variable from the statement of cash flows. The measure of book equity I employ is denoted PNIBV, and is defined as book equity at the end of the quarter after subtracting net income earned during the quarter and adding back dividends paid out during the quarter. I use this definition of book equity instead of simply book equity at the end of the quarter because it facilitates the computation of the marginal impacts of income or the components of income on equity market value. 8 Per table 1, core income is defined as revenues less cost of sales less selling general and administrative expenses less research and development expenses. 9 Dividends are included largely because they may act as a signal of management's expectations of future profitability or the probability of survival.
The goodness of fit of each model is assessed using three measures beyond the adjusted R 2 statistic. First, I compute the average percentage of firm-quarter observations that have negative fitted values (averaged across the time-series of quarterly regressions). All else held equal, a well-specified equity market valuation regression should ideally yield no negative fitted equity market values. Second, following Ye and Finn (2000) , I compute the mean and median absolute relative pricing error (RPE) and the mean and median absolute symmetrized relative pricing error (SRPE). For a given firm, RPE and SRPE are defined by:
where MVE i is firm i's equity market value, and is the equity market value fitted from the regression. Both RPE and SRPE are relative measures; they are not contaminated by scaling factors associated with measurement units in the way that adjusted
statistics can be (Brown, Lo and Lys, 1999) . I report statistics for both relative and symmetrized relative pricing errors because the simple relative pricing error weights overpricing more than underpricing (implying that a model that overprices stocks would appear to provide a better fit than one that underprices). 10 The symmetrized absolute relative pricing error corrects this concern in the sense that underpricing by 50% yields an SRPE of the same size as overpricing by 100%.
Regression results
The regression results for model 1 indicate that book equity and dividends are strongly related to equity market values. However, core income appears entirely unrelated to equity market values! The explanation for this counter-intuitive result lies in the biased nature of U.S.
accounting rules for intangible assets (Hand, 2001a; Zhang, 2000) . Under U.S. GAAP, virtually all expenditures on intangibles such as R&D, branding, and human capital are required to be expensed as incurred-they are not permitted to be recognized on firms' balance sheets and then amortized into expense over time as is the case with tangible fixed assets such as PP&E. The result of this is that for intangible-intensive companies such as biotech or Internet firms, reported income is highly downward-biased because a much greater expense is being recognized in income than should be the case. Indeed, Zhang (2000) argues that when spending on intangibles becomes large enough, particularly by small but fast growing companies, equity market value will become a negative, not positive, function of reported net income when net income is negative. This is exactly what Hand (2001a) finds to be true for Internet firms.
There are then two approaches to controlling for the distortive effects of accounting bias.
The first is to allow positive and negative core income to have different coefficients (as well as different intercepts). 11 This is predicated on the assumption that firms with negative core income 9 I use core income instead of net income for two reasons. First, relative to net income, core income does not contain large and distortive one-time items. Second, since most biotech firms report losses not profits, tax expense can be largely set aside. 10 For example, suppose that M = $100 and that two predicted prices M 1 = $150 and M 2 = $50 are being evaluated. Each predicted price deviates from the actual price by $50, and yields an RPE of 0.5. However, M 1 is overpriced by 33.3%, while M 2 is underpriced by 100%. The symmetrized RPE corrects for this. The SRPE for M 1 is 1, while the SRPE for M 2 is 0.5. 11 All models except model 1 also include dummy variables for those variables that can take a zero value. For example, all models except model 1 include a dummy variable set equal to one if treasury stock is zero, and zero otherwise. Dummies of this kind cover treasury stock TS, revenues REV, cost of sales COS, research and development RD, and dividends DIV. In addition, model 2 contains a dummy set equal to one if core net income CI is negative, and zero otherwise. Finally, all models except model 1 include a dummy set equal to one if retained earnings adjusted for the current quarters net income and dividends PNIRE is negative, zero otherwise.
are much more intangible-intensive than are firms with positive core income. Evidence consistent with this assumption is shown in panels B and C of table 5. For example, negative core income firm-quarter observations have a median market-to-book ratio of 4.1 as compared to 2.9 for positive firm-quarter observations (panel B). Negative core income firm-quarter observations also have a vastly greater median ratio of R&D spending to revenue-1.33 relative to 0.05 for positive core income firm-quarters.
Model 2 allows positive and negative core income to have different coefficients, at the same time as book equity is replaced by its three major components. (The two steps are done together rather than separate only for the sake of compactness, since the inferences from doing both together are the same as are found doing each separately). Table 6 demonstrates that this simple control has major impacts on the results found for model 1. In model 2, the coefficient on positive (negative) core income is strongly positive (negative), supporting the accounting bias view. Also, the signs on the major components of book equity are as one would predict: those on contributed capital and retained earnings are reliably positive, while that on treasury stock (stock that has been repurchased by the company) is reliably negative. Dividends remains significant, although with a much larger standard error than in model 1, suggesting that its strong significance in model 1 may be because dividends are correlated with the specification errors created by not separating core income into positive and negative parts. Finally, the fit of model 2 is much improved over that of model 1. The adjusted R 2 of the regression increases from 35% to 63%; the average relative prediction error (RPE) declines from 166% to 101%; and the standardized relative prediction error (SRPE) falls from 530% to 145%.
The second approach to controlling for the distortive effects of accounting bias is to decompose core income into its constituent parts: revenues, cost of sales, selling general and administrative costs, and R&D expense. This method separates out the components of core income that are much more likely not to be biased as a result of accounting rules from those that are. Falling in the unbiased category will be revenues and cost of sales; while selling general and administrative costs and R&D expense will be either somewhat or very biased reflections of the underlying economics. U.S. accounting rules recognize revenue in a manner that closely reflects the underlying economics, and cost of sales are only recognized when revenues are, and also in an amount that reflects the direct cost of the sales made. This means that the value elasticity of revenues is predicted to be positive, while that on cost of sales is predicted to be negative.
In contrast, as I already argued earlier, only a small portion of R&D expense is truly an expense-that is, a benefit that is used up in the current period. Most of R&D expense is an asset-a cost with the ability or potential to provide future economic benefit to the firm. This is particularly the case for biotech firms, where the benefits from R&D are almost always obtained many years after the R&D expenditure is made. Hence the value elasticity of R&D is predicted to be positive. However, selling general and administrative costs are less clearly assets, because most general and administrative costs represent current period expenditures that have no future benefits (e.g., rent for an administration building). However, also included in SG&A are salaries for senior management and selling expenses. I argue that these types of costs do have future benefits, such as enhancing the likelihood that senior management will stay with the firm, and creating brand intangibles, respectively. For SG&A costs, the net result of the mix of expenses and assets is unclear, leading me to make no sign prediction on the value elasticity of SG&A.
Model 3 implements this second approach to controlling for the distortive effects of accounting bias. The results shown in table 6 indicate that as predicted, the value elasticity of revenues (cost of sales) is reliably positive (negative). Also as predicted, the value elasticity of R&D is strongly positive. The value elasticity of SG&A for biotech firms is estimated to be unambiguously positive, implying that the stock market views most of SG&A as having economic benefits beyond the current quarter. Decomposing core income also improves the goodness-of-fit measures, particularly the average percentage RPE and SRPE.
Model 4 implements this same approach to controlling for accounting bias, but it does so by using the sum of cost of sales and SG&A. This is because as noted in table 1 and observed in   table 4 , quarterly Compustat only reports SG&A for 5,357 of the 12,520 firm-quarters in my data set (the remainder of the time it is missing). It is this subset that is used in Model 3. However, quarterly Compustat always reports a cost of sales that it defines as total operating expenses if SG&A is missing. The sum of cost of sales and SG&A can therefore always be estimated by subtracting R&D expense from cost of sales if SG&A is missing. The results of estimating model 4 yield similar inferences on most coefficients to those of model 3. However, combining cost of sales and SG&A worsens the RPE and SRPE goodness-of-fit measures relative to model 3, and weakens the significance of the coefficient estimates on treasury stock and revenues.
In sections 3.1 -3.5, I hypothesized that the elasticity of equity market value with respect to R&D is a function of five factors: where the R&D lies in the biotech value chain of discovery, development and commercialization; the growth rate in R&D spending; the scale of R&D expenditures; the human capital of the firm's employees; and the age of the firm. Models 5 and 6 test each of these predictions with the exception of that to do with the human capital of the firm's employees. That prediction I take into account and test in models 7, 8 and 9.
Using the financial statement proxies for these hypothesized factors outlined in sections 3.1 -3.5, I find as predicted that the elasticity of biotech firms' equity market values with respect to R&D is significantly larger the earlier is the R&D expenditure in the value chain, and the greater is the growth rate in R&D spending. In both model 5 and model 6, the coefficients on the proxies for the earliness of the R&D expenditure in the value chain LRD*LRDREV, and the growth rate in R&D spending LRD*LRDGRW, are strongly positive. Moreover, in model 5 the coefficients the scale of R&D expenditures LRD*LRD, and the age/maturity of the firm LRD*LFIRMAGE are each reliably negative. While no predictions on the signs were made for the coefficients on LRD*LRD and LRD*LFIRMAGE, they indicate that empirically it appears to be the case that on average there are decreasing returns-to-scale for R&D expenditures made by biotech firms, and that the negatives of firm maturity are perceived by the stock market to outweigh the positives. I view the significance of the coefficients on LRD*LRD and LRD*LFIRMAGE in model 5 as more reliable than the insignificance of these same coefficients in model 6 because of the concerns I voiced earlier about combining cost of sales and SG&A into one variable, and the empirical fact that model 6 fits the data less well than does model 5.
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The final set of results augment those of models 5 and 6 by testing the hypothesis that employees' knowledge and skill has a positive impact on the value elasticity of R&D. I measure the quantity of human capital employed by the firm using the total number of employees EMPL, and the quality of human capital by the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses (SGA) to EMPL. One component of SGA is the salary cost of senior management and scientists.
Although potentially quite noisy, I propose that the ratio of SGA to the number of employees will be proportional to the size of the average salary paid to senior management and scientists, and therefore a proxy for the quality of employee human capital.
These proxies are each interacted with R&D in models 7 and 8. However, both the coefficient on LRD*LEMPL and LRD*LSGAEMPL are resoundingly insignificantly different from zero, leading me to the inference that biotech firms' employees' knowledge and skill has no impact on the value elasticity of R&D. A marginally positive effect for LRD*LEMPL is found in model 9, which uses the sum of cost of sales and SG&A in place of the two separately, but as before this specification may be suspect.
Conclusions
In this paper I have sought to shed light on how and why the stock market values high technology by examining the pricing of 606 publicly traded biotechnology firms. Contrary to the common view that the primary value drivers of biotechnology are 'soft' variables such as intellectual human capital, patents, strategic alliances and joint ventures, I found that simple but 'hard' balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash flows data explain some 70% of the variance in biotech firms' equity market values within a log-linear regression framework.
Given the size and economic importance of R&D to biotech firms, I also analyzed the mapping between the biotech firms' R&D expenditures and equity market values. I hypothesized that the elasticity of equity market value with respect to R&D is a function of five factors: where the R&D lies in the biotech value chain of discovery, development and commercialization; the growth rate in R&D spending; the scale of R&D expenditures; the human capital of the firm's employees; and the age of the firm. Using financial statement proxies for these factors, I found that the elasticity of biotech firms' equity market values with respect to R&D is significantly larger the earlier is the R&D expenditure in the value chain, and the greater is the growth rate in R&D spending. The value elasticity of R&D is also reliably decreasing in the scale of R&D expenditures, and the maturity of the firm.
In terms of future work, one logical next step would be to conduct a more sector-specific analysis of what has been done in this paper. That is, I have assumed that it appropriate to pool biotech firms that make pharmaceutical preparations (SIC 2834) with those that make biological products (SIC 2836) and 60 other 4-digit SICs. Such an assumption is almost certainly too restrictive, and deserving of further research. 
B io te c h v a lu e c h a in F ig u r e 1
Discovery and preclinical: The drug development process usually begins with the scientific discovery of a gene or other biological pathway involved in a disease. Discovery can take 2-10 years. From discovery, a target for therapeutic intervention is established. Preclinical tests are conducted in the lab using individual cells or sometimes animals to evaluate the safety and potential for effectiveness in humans. If the target is determined to be legitimate, the company files an Investigative New Drug (IND) application with the FDA for clearance to begin testing on humans. Preclinical discoveries or results are often the ones that get the greatest media attention. This stage is still very early in the process, however, and even after these first few years of research and testing, most candidates at this point will never make it to the market.
Phase I Trials: Human testing begins. The purpose of a Phase I trial is to use a small number of patients to establish basic safety and maximum dosage parameters.
Phase II Trials: This clinical study is much more involved, requiring many months to plan, set up and recruit trial participants. Phase II is conducted on a larger group of patients with the targeted disease to study the efficacy of the drug at various doses and confirm its safety. They typically use blinding and placebo controls to achieve scientifically sound results. Phase II often lasts two years, and sometimes a drug will undergo multiple Phase II trials for different indications (for example, to treat different types of a cancer). This may be the most critical phase in terms of sorting winners from losers. As a rule of thumb, drugs that complete Phase II and move on to Phase III have about a 50% success rate of reaching the market, though some studies suggest the rate is higher.
Phase III Trials: These tests are designed with a specific endpoint-a measurable result that clearly demonstrates success in combating the targeted disease. The endpoint must be agreed upon by the FDA as an outcome that will lead to marketing approval. The trial involves a large group from the targeted patient population and uses controls such as doubleblinding (neither patient nor doctor knows who is getting a placebo). Multi-center trials are common to show that results are reproducible when administered in different clinical settings. This pivotal phase often lasts two to three years from initial design to study completion, and here again it is common for drugs to undergo more than one Phase III trial for different indications or to support different therapy combinations.
FDA Approval Process: If a drug successfully completes Phase III, the company gathers all of its clinical data and files an application for marketing approval with the FDA. It often takes three to six months just to prepare the application. Another six to twelve months can pass before an FDA advisory panel reviews the application and makes a recommendation. This advisory panel has expertise in the drug's specific area of therapeutic or disease characteristics, and its recommendation for denial or approval is normally followed by the FDA (though another six to twelve months can pass before that happens). -940 -1,235 -2,142 -4,015 -5,687 -8,218 -9,332 -11,893 -13,813 -15,202 -19,645 -19 
